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Abstract 
Using the UK Citizenship Survey for the years 2007 – 2010, this paper 
investigates how immigrants view immigration and how these views compare 
to the views of natives. Immigrants who have been in the UK longer are similar 
to natives in being opposed to further immigration, while recent immigrants 
are more in favour of further immigration. Labour market concerns do not 
play a large role for either immigrants nor natives. However, there is some 
evidence that financial and economic shocks can increase anti-immigration 
sentiments.  
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1. Introduction 
Questions of immigration policy and opinions on immigration in general have 
recently taken centre stage in various political decisions, such as the 
referendum vote in the UK to leave the European Union or the ultimately 
successful run for the US presidency by Donald Trump. This paper considers 
the views of immigrants and natives towards further immigration as well as 
their determinants. 
Most of the literature concerned with support for, or opposition to, 
immigration has focused on natives, while the views of immigrants already in 
a host country have received less attention.1 There are, however, marked 
differences between natives and immigrants: According to the UK Citizenship 
Survey (2007 – 2010) around 71% of respondents are opposed to further 
immigration.2 Unsurprisingly, this number increases to 83% of all natives, but 
even among immigrants almost 50% oppose further immigration. However, 
immigrants are themselves not homogeneous, for example in terms of the time 
they have already spent in a country and their degree of integration into their 
host country’s culture. To capture this heterogeneity, we consider two groups 
of immigrants: those who have been in the country for 5 years or more (earlier 
immigrants) and those who have been in the country for fewer than 5 years 
                                       
1 For a critical review of immigration related theories and immigration related literature see, 
Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) and Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014a). Among others, some 
of the recent research papers on views of natives towards further immigration using data from 
the European Social Survey include, Bridges and Mateut (2014), Malchow-Moller et al. (2009), 
Malchow-Moller et al. (2008), Markaki and Longhi (2013), Ortega and Polavieja (2012), and 
O’Connell (2011). 
2 According to the Office for National Statistics’ quarterly report published in February, 2012, 
593,000 immigrants came to the UK in between June 2010 to June 2011 (ONS, 2012). In 
June 2009 to June 2010, 582,000 immigrants came to the UK and the number of immigrants 
coming to UK has been around this level since 2004. In the labour market, 690,000 National 
Insurance Numbers were issued to people having any nationality other than British in the 
year up to September, 2011. This allocation of National Insurance Numbers was an increase 
of 11% relative to the previous year. 
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(recent immigrants). Among the former 53% of respondents are opposed to 
further immigration, while only 33% of recent immigrants oppose further 
immigration, already illustrating the importance of the aforementioned 
heterogeneity.  
In this paper, we investigate these differences in attitudes towards 
immigration.3 Our results show that immigrants who have been in the country 
for five years or more have views on immigration that are similar to those of 
natives, i.e., they are more likely to oppose further immigration than recent 
immigrants. Recent immigrants are the least likely to oppose further 
immigration. We find that these results are robust to the inclusion of socio-
economic characteristics. Labour market concerns do not seem to influence 
views, however financial and economic shocks are associated with anti-
immigration responses.    
The literature investigating the attitudes of immigrants towards 
immigration and determinants of immigrants’ attitudes is sparse.4 Most of the 
research concerning the attitudes of immigrants towards immigrants covers 
the US (see, for example, Binder, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1997; Hood, Morris, 
and Shirkey, 1997; Polindar, Wrinkle, and de la Garza, 1984; Sanchez and 
Masouka, 2010). A recent European addition on this topic is by Just and 
                                       
3 Much of the previous economics literature that this paper contributes to, refers to “attitudes” 
rather than views. In the wider social sciences, “attitudes” are often taken to represent a 
deeper psychological consideration that cannot be identified from the questions normally used 
in the research in economics on attitudes. For the purpose of this paper the terms “attitudes" 
and "views” are used interchangeably assuming that, even if they are not identical, they are 
highly correlated. 
4 Most of the literature investigate natives’ views towards further immigration and find 
evidence for a strong positive relation between education and support for (further) immigration 
see, for example, Card et al. (2005), Constant and Zimmermann (2013), Dustmann and 
Preston (2004), and Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2013) for Europe, Dustmann and Preston 
(2001) for England, Vervoort (2012) for Netherlands, Bauer et al. (2000), for OECD countries 
and Citrin et al. (1997), Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Hainmueller and Hopkins 
(2014b), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001) for USA. 
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Anderson, (2015). They use data from 5 rounds of the European Social Survey 
conducted 2002 – 2011 for 18 European countries. They explore two opposing 
channels of immigrants’ attitudes towards immigration: a) shared experiences, 
unity and ties with other immigrants and b) integration into the host country. 
The former channel leads to supportive attitudes as immigrants are keen to 
build communities. The latter channel generates negative attitudes towards 
further immigration as immigrants adopt the views of natives. 
The literature generally points towards the following reasons why 
immigrants (and natives) might be opposed to future immigration. Firstly, 
immigration may be perceived to have a detrimental effect on the labour 
market prospects of natives and immigrants who are already in the host 
country.5 This opposition might also differ between earlier and more recent 
immigrants, as well as natives, due to differences in their (perceived) 
substitutability in the labour market. If, for example, new immigrants are 
closer substitutes for recent immigrants than for earlier immigrants or 
natives, opposition in this group might well be more substantial.6 On the other 
hand, pro-immigration views may arise because respondents consider 
immigration to be beneficial for the host country’s economy or for their 
businesses (see, for example, Dustmann et al., 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2007; Manacorda et al., 2012; and Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). 
                                       
5 Although this may be a consequence on the “lump of labour” fallacy, i.e., individuals’ 
perception that there is fixed number of jobs in the economy that can be distributed between 
immigrants and natives, whereas, new jobs are created as a natural reaction to the expansion 
and growth of businesses and economy on the influx of new immigrants. 
6 See the special issue of the Journal of the European Economic Association (Card, Dustmann 
and Preston, 2012; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth, 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; 
Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2012; Card, 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2012) for a 
comprehensive discussion of the current state of the literature. 
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Secondly, all three groups may be opposed to further immigration out 
of concern for public services. If immigration places a strain on public services, 
such as education (see, for example, Betts and Fairlie, 2003; Geay et al., 2013; 
Ohinata and van Ours, 2013; or Schneeweis, 2013), public safety (for example, 
Bell et al., 2013), health care or welfare, users of these services, regardless of 
their origin, might oppose further immigration. 
Thirdly, there may be opposition to immigration because of a fear that 
it may threaten the culture of the host nation. This argument is primarily 
relevant for natives, but also to some extent for existing immigrants, who may 
view immigration as an erosion of social cohesion (Hickman, Crowley and Mai; 
2008, Saggar et al.; 2012). This may be especially true if the countries that 
are the source of immigration are changing over time. For example, in the UK 
many of the earlier immigrants were from Commonwealth/ex-Empire 
countries, whereas many recent immigrants are from Europe. 
Earlier and recent immigrants may hold different views on further 
immigration because the former have integrated into the host society. 
Manning and Roy (2010) provide some evidence on this process, although they 
refer to assimilation rather than integration. They find that immigrants – with 
the exception of Irish and Italians – consider themselves more British the 
longer they stay in the UK and that even immigrants from a diverse range of 
background, integrate successfully. Given this assimilation, it appears 
entirely possible that immigrants also adopt the natives’ resistance to further 
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immigration.7 One the other hand it is possible that immigrants favour further 
immigration, especially from their own country of origin, out of feelings of 
shared experiences, unity and ties with other immigrants (Just and Anderson, 
2015), because it enables them to form links with people who share the same 
culture and heritage or simply because they want to bring their families to the 
host country in the future.  
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
the dataset, section 3 presents empirical strategy, threats to identification 
strategy and methodology used in this paper, section 4 presents results and 
section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
This paper uses three waves (2007-2010) of the UK Citizenship Survey.8 
The survey is conducted in England and Wales, covers people aged 16 and 
above and consists of a core sample of around 10,000 individuals and a 
minority ethnic boost sample of around 5,000 individuals. For this paper 
respondents are categorized on the basis of country of birth of respondent and 
country of birth of their mother and father in order to differentiate between 
immigrants and natives. This classification gives us the six broad categories 
listed below. These classifications are subdivided on the basis of ethnicity and 
self-assessed nationality and are shown in table 1.  
                                       
7 It should be noted that integration and assimilation convey different meanings. Integration 
means to integrate own preferences in the cultural setting of the destination country, whereas, 
assimilation indicates replacement of own preferences with those of the country of destination 
(see, Berry (1997)). This paper uses the term integration for the sake of its own findings and 
analysis, however, the term assimilation is used to connect this paper with the assimilation 
process presented in the work of Manning and Roy (2010). 
8 The survey has been collected since 2001. Initially it was a biennial survey conducted by the 
Home Office, in 2006 it fell under the auspices of the Communities and Local Government 
department now the Department for Communities and Local Government. From 2007 
onwards the survey has been conducted annually, with data collection taking place each 
quarter. The publicly available data for this period combines four quarters, giving surveys for 
2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, and 2010-11. 
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1. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born in the UK. 
2. Respondents born in the UK with one parent born abroad. 
3. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born abroad. 
4. Respondents born abroad with both parents born in the UK. 
5. Respondents born abroad with one parent born abroad. 
6. Respondents born abroad with both parents born abroad. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In our main specification, we focus on groups 1 and 6. We refer to the 
first group as “natives” and group 6 as “immigrants”. While this classification 
may be imperfect we believe that they provide a mechanism for distinguishing 
between natives and immigrants.  These two categories make up 85% of the 
total respondents, with 55% classed as natives and 30% classed as 
immigrants. The remaining 15% of respondents fall into one of the other four 
groups making it difficult to assign individuals to “natives” or “immigrants”.  
As robustness checks we try two different classifications: Firstly, we 
classify anyone born in the UK as a native (groups 1, 2 and 3) and compare 
these to group 6. Secondly, we divide the sample into three groups: i) 
“immigrants”, i.e., overseas-born individuals with at least one overseas-born 
parent (groups 5 and 6); ii) “natives with immigration background”, i.e., either 
overseas-born individuals with only UK-born parents (group 4), for example, 
children of British soldier families born while stationed in Germany, or , UK-
born individuals with at least one overseas-born parent (groups 2 and 3); and 
iii) “natives”, i.e., UK-born with no foreign-born parent (group 1). We will see 
that our results do not depend on the exact definition of immigrants and 
natives that we use. 
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Immigrants are further divided into two categories based on the length 
of time they have lived in the UK. Individuals who were born overseas are 
asked whether they have lived in the UK for five years or more. We use this 
question to divide our group into earlier immigrants (five years of more in the 
UK) and recent immigrants (less than five years in the UK). While the 
categorisation of earlier and recent is data driven we believe that the five-year 
time horizon is important. For example, Manning and Roy (2010) show that 
immigrants start to change their attitudes slowly a year after their arrival into 
the UK, and that, subsequently, integration becomes increasingly quick. 
Therefore, taking 5 years as a threshold to identify earlier and recent 
immigrants is plausible enough to determine the heterogeneity in the attitudes 
of immigrants.   
Our key dependent variable is the answer to the question, “Do you think 
the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, 
reduced or should it remain the same?” A follow-up question to respondents 
then asks whether the number should be increased or reduced by a little or a 
lot. For most of the analysis, “increased a lot”, “increased a little” and “remain 
the same” are grouped together, as all indicate that the respondent does not 
want immigration to be cut. People replying “increased a lot” and “increased a 
little” are clearly in favour of immigration, while those replying “remain the 
same” also hold no opposition to further immigration. We also group the 
choices “reduced a lot” and “reduced a little” as both indicate a wish to see 
immigration reduced. Respondents selecting “cannot choose” are excluded 
from the analysis. This generates an indicator variable of whether an 
individual is opposed to further immigration.  
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We assess the robustness of these choices in two ways: We run ordered 
probit models on the original (5 category) outcome variable and we also run 
the same models without individuals who replied “remain the same”. The 
results are largely unchanged. 
Our data also contain information on survey year, gender, age, 
ethnicity, religion, practicing religion and region of residence, all of which are 
included as control variables. Furthermore, we also have data on employment 
status and income, allowing us to investigate the roles that the labour market 
and social status play in determining attitudes towards immigration. Control 
variables for all the models are the same unless mentioned. Dummy indicators 
are generated for all of these variables.   
The omitted category for the variable survey year is “wave 2007 – 2008”, 
for gender it is “male”, and “London” for the regions. In terms of ethnicity, we 
distinguish between “White”, “Black”, “Subcontinent”, “Chinese”, “other 
Asian”, “mixed race” and “other ethnicities”. “Black” ethnicity is comprised of 
“Black Caribbean”, “Black African” and “other black ethnicities”. Subcontinent 
includes “Indian”, “Pakistani” and “Bangladeshi” ethnicities. For the ethnicity 
variable “white” is the omitted category. Eight dummies are created for the 
religion variable and are labelled as, “Budh”, “Hindu”, “Jewish”, “Muslim”, 
“Christian”, “Sikh”, “no religion” and “other religion”. “Christian” is the omitted 
dummy for religion. For the variable whether a person is “practicing religion 
or not”, “not practicing religion” is considered as the reference category. 
“Employed” is the reference group for the employment status dummies. 
Income of the respondent is used to proxy for social status. The reference 
category for the income variable is “£10,000 – £15,000”. 
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These control variables have been included because most of the 
literature on attitudes uses these variables in their regressions (see, for 
example, Dustmann and Preston (2007)). Although some variables that may 
be found in other literature on attitudes could not be included because of the 
data restrictions (for example data on the formal acquisition of citizenship of 
immigrants is not available). 
Our key variable of interest is an individual’s migration status. Being 
native serves as the reference group enabling us to explore differences between 
natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants.   
One variable that we would have liked to have considered more fully is 
'education'. However, in our data only individuals under the age of 65 are 
asked their educational status, limiting our analysis. We estimated models 
using the whole sample, omitting the education variable, and for the subset of 
under 65s including the available education information. The estimates of the 
models for the under 65s show that the coefficient of our key variable, migrant 
status, remained largely unchanged; however, we found that higher education 
is associated with favourable views towards immigration for natives, earlier 
and recent immigrants. 
Finally, we also use the 2009/10 data that contains additional 
information on economic circumstances. Four types of economic worries are 
considered, specifically whether the respondent has lost his/her job, 
experienced a drop in income, had to cutback spending on necessities such 
as food or shelter, or had to cutback spending on non-necessities, such as 
entertainment expenses or charity donations in last twelve months. The 
reference category for this variable is “not reporting any worry”. These four 
additional models are estimated for the pooled sample and for natives, earlier 
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and recent immigrants separately. These are included in separate models to 
consider how the onset of financial difficulties affects support for immigration. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows that immigrants are on average younger than natives, and 
recent immigrants are, on average, the youngest group. Recent immigrants 
are more likely to be male, employed (and unemployed) and less likely to be 
out of the labour force than natives. Immigrants have, on average, lower 
incomes than natives, with recent immigrants having over a third of 
respondents in the lowest income group. Natives are mostly “White” by 
ethnicity, “Subcontinent” is the most dominant ethnicity in earlier and recent 
immigrants. Natives are mostly “Christian” by faith, whereas earlier 
immigrants are mostly “Muslim” and recent immigrants mostly “Christian”. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
We begin by considering simple differences between natives, earlier and 
recent immigrants in their attitudes towards further immigration. These 
unconditional models provide a starting point for investigating differences in 
attitudes. 
 Subsequently, we control for socio-economic characteristics. The 
estimate of the coefficient attached to migrant status is now purged of 
observable differences in characteristics. This step enables us to see whether 
differences in socio-economic variables, such as labour market status, 
economic situation, or cultural background variables, such as religion, are 
responsible for the observed differences between natives and the various 
immigrant groups. It is difficult to make claims of causality with regards to 
these variables as at least some of them, such as practicing a religion, might 
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very well be correlated with unobservables that also matter for a respondent’s 
views on immigration policy.  
Unless mentioned, our estimating equation for all the models is  
Y = α + β’I + γ’X + ζ’Z + ε         (1) 
Where Y is the outcome variable, α is the intercept, β is the coefficient 
vector for our key dummy variable I that indicates the migration status of the 
respondent, γ is the coefficient vector for the key independent variables (X), ζ 
is the coefficient vector for our additional controls such as regional dummies 
and age contained in Z, and ε represents the error term. 
Our key interest lies in the estimation of the β, coefficients attached to 
dummy variables indicating whether an individual is a native (the omitted 
category), an earlier immigrant, or a recent immigrant. Also of interest are 
coefficients on variables describing a respondent’s labour market outcomes 
and economic status, as there is a strong public perception that opposition to 
immigration is primarily driven by labour market concerns. 
We estimate our models using OLS, probit and ordered probit 
regressions to account for the binary nature of our main dichotomised 
outcome, as well as the ordinal nature of the underlying variable. For further 
analysis, we employ a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973) to decompose the mean differences of the determinants of attitudes 
towards immigration for natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants, 
taken in pairs. The decomposition allows us to further investigate whether 
attitudes towards immigration are determined by differences in endowments, 
i.e., differences in the characteristics of natives and immigrants, or 
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coefficients, i.e., the partial correlations between these characteristics and the 
outcome.  
There are two reasons why the results should be seen as more 
descriptive than causal. Firstly, there may be unobservable characteristics, 
such as productivity or cultural upbringing, which contribute to views on 
immigration that may differ systematically between our groups. While we can 
use observable characteristics to overcome some of these problems, such as 
using education in the under 65-sample as a proxy for productivity, these are 
still imperfect controls.  
Secondly, there are two potential sample selection problems as well. The 
first arises because some natives, who might be pro-immigration, may migrate 
abroad, meaning that they will not appear in the survey, potentially leading to 
an over-estimate of negative views towards immigration. 
The second, and more important problem, relates to sample selection 
among immigrants. While our observation of recent immigrants may be largely 
representative of the population who have arrived in Great Britain, the same 
is not true of our earlier immigrant population. The problem we face is that 
some of the immigrants who initially arrived in Britain will return home or 
venture to other countries. The reasons for leaving can be diverse, although 
the most likely are that the period of work in Britain came to an end (or they 
found another job elsewhere), or that they did not find what they were looking 
for and decided to leave. Such behaviours mean that composition of recent 
immigrants might well be subtly different from that of earlier immigrants, 
leading to some issues when trying to generalise our results to the wider 
(future) population.  
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4. Results 
Panel A of Table 3 gives the results from the unconditional and 
conditional models for our preferred definition of immigrant and natives. The 
conditional models include controls for employment status, income level, age 
dummies, ethnicity, gender, religion, wave year and Government Office Region 
of residence. All models suggest that both immigrant groups are less opposed 
to further immigration than natives. Furthermore, the estimates for earlier 
immigrants are always closer to zero than the estimates for recent immigrants. 
Quantitatively, the unconditional models suggest that earlier immigrants are 
between 26 and 29 percentage points less likely to oppose immigration than 
natives, while the corresponding numbers for recent immigrants are between 
41 and 49 percentage points. The coefficients are economically large and 
highly significant.  
We obtain a similar pattern of results when using an ordered probit. In 
the conditional models, the estimates are nearly halved for all models.  Earlier 
immigrants are now between 12 and 13 percentage points less likely to oppose 
further immigration than natives, while recent immigrants are between 24 and 
30 percentage points less likely, as presented in column (5) and (6) of Table 3. 
However, the differences between the three groups remain large and 
statistically significant. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents estimates for a model, without a 
constant, that includes dummies for natives, earlier and recent immigrants. 
In the unconditional models, the estimates correspond to the fraction of 
respondents in each of the groups who are opposed to further immigration. In 
the conditional models, these dummies can be interpreted as residual 
differences after the effects of the other observable variables have been taken 
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out. Including these reduces the residual share of respondents who are 
opposed to immigration in each group. Residual shares are still large, however, 
suggesting that the opposition to immigration is not just driven by the 
included RHS variables. The results for earlier immigrants are between those 
of natives and recent immigrants. We conduct F-tests to check for the equality 
of the coefficients and find that the coefficients of the three groups are 
significantly different from each other. Additionally, confidence intervals 
around the coefficients from the three groups do not overlap, again suggesting 
a significant difference. From these results, it is clear that support for further 
immigration differs widely between the three groups and that earlier 
immigrants hold views that, on average, fall between the views of natives and 
recent immigrants. 
    [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 explores the impact of using alternative definitions of 
immigrants or natives as described in section 2, again for conditional and 
unconditional models. Columns (1) and (2) are replicated from Table 3, while 
columns (3) and (4) and (5) and (6) rely on alternative definitions. As we can 
see the results are fairly independent of these choices.  
    [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 5, we present separate models for natives, earlier and recent 
immigrants. These suggest that, by and large, and with the exception of earlier 
immigrants who are out of the labour force, none of the labour market 
dummies are significant. It is interesting to note that the significant coefficient 
for “out of the labour force” suggests that these respondents are, if anything, 
more in favour of further immigration than employed respondents.  Based on 
these results, it appears that labour market status is largely unrelated to anti-
16 
 
immigration views for any of the groups. These findings are in line with the 
findings of Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Card et al. (2012) who also find 
that labour market concerns are not important in determining natives’ views 
towards immigration. Furthermore, a range of studies find that welfare 
concerns or non-economic concerns, such as a loss of identity are more 
important than the labour market concerns.9 
Income dummies are used to analyse the impact of economic status on 
opposition to further immigration. It is interesting to note that for natives and 
earlier immigrants a clear gradient emerges, presented in Figure 1. Natives 
and immigrants with higher income are more likely to be in support of further 
immigration. For recent immigrants the pattern appears to be less clear. 
Relative to individuals earning between £10k and £15k, individuals with lower 
incomes are between 8 and 1 percentage points less likely to oppose 
immigration, while respondents with higher income are also less opposed 
towards further immigration, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between income and opposition to immigration.  Potential explanations for this 
somewhat unexpected result at low incomes could be the role of non-monetary 
motives such as family reunification, or the desire for individuals to see more 
immigration from their home country, which may be stronger for recent 
immigrants than for earlier immigrants. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                       
9 Card et al. (2012), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Rustenbach (2010), for Europe, 
Dustmann and Preston (2007), for England, Heath et al. (2013) for Britain, Fetzer (2011) for 
U.S. and Europe, Bakker and Dekker (2012) for Amsterdam, Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 
(2013) for South Africa, Stanley et al. (2012) for Australia, Nielsen et al. (2012) for a small 
Italian town, and Mayda (2006) for developed and developing countries emphasize the 
importance of social interaction, social capital, sense of society, interpersonal trust and 
compositional concerns. 
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In terms of the other control variables, Table 5 suggests some gender 
differences among the two immigrant groups but not among natives. There are 
also some differences across the various ethnic groups.10 While difficult to 
interpret, these could principally point towards differences by region or 
country of origin. Finally, the religion dummies suggest that more sympathy 
towards further immigration among non-Christian faiths.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we look at the effect of economic shocks experienced in the 
previous year. Our results, shown in Table 6, suggest that experience in the 
previous period of a job loss, a drop in income, having to cut back expenses 
or having to cut back expenses on both necessities and luxuries are associated 
with a stronger opposition to further immigration, even when controlling for 
current circumstances (see, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2013) for similar 
findings). 
For natives, job loss is associated with a 4 percentage points increase 
in opposition to further immigration, while drops in income and cutbacks in 
necessities are associated with a 2 percentage points increase. For earlier 
immigrants, drops in income and cutbacks in luxuries appear to matter most, 
while job loss and cutbacks in necessities appear to be less important. Finally, 
the point estimates for recent immigrants suggest that they react more 
strongly to job losses, drops in income and, in particular, cutbacks in 
necessities than the other groups. These results suggest that changes in 
                                       
10 We conducted a robustness check to test whether the estimates for natives in table 5 are 
derived by the “actual natives” (natives with white ethnicity) or by the earlier generations of 
immigrants whose parents were born in the UK too and our definition of natives characterized 
them as natives. After excluding 880 cases of natives with other than white ethnicity and 
running the same regressions again, we still found the similar estimates. It shows that 
estimates are driven by actual natives with white ethnicity.  
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economic status in earlier periods, such as drops in income or job loss, matter 
for people’s views on immigration, even when holding the current levels of 
these variables constant. 
On the whole, our results support our earlier suggestion that earlier 
immigrants appear to hold views closer to those of natives than to recent 
immigrants.11 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 presents the results from Blinder-Oaxaca-decompositions for 
the various group pairings, a) natives and earlier immigrants, b) natives and 
recent immigrants and c) earlier immigrants and recent immigrants. The mean 
difference in the fraction of respondents who are opposed to immigration 
between the earlier mentioned three groups a), b) and c) is 29.2, 48.8 and 19.6 
percentage points, with a 1% level of significance. The “endowments effect” is 
only significant for comparison a) with a point estimate of 11.2, suggesting 
that about 40% of the differential can be explained by differences in 
characteristics. For comparisons b) and c) only the “coefficients effect” is 
significant, with point estimates of 28.3 and 20.1 percentage points. It shows 
that the recent immigrants would be 28.3 (20.1) percentage points more 
opposed to immigration if the coefficients of natives (earlier immigrants) were 
applied to recent immigrants’ characteristics. These results suggest that for 
these comparisons it is not differences in the characteristics between the 
groups that matters but the fact that the marginal effects are different. The 
fact that the results are similar when comparing both natives and earlier 
                                       
11 As a robustness check, all the respondents who responded with “remain the same” to the 
outcome question are dropped from the data and all the models are rerun. Results from these 
regressions remain fairly similar. If anything, the similarities between earlier immigrants and 
natives increased.  
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immigrants to recent immigrants again confirms the view that natives and 
earlier immigrants are increasingly similar. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Much of the empirical literature has focused on the impact of immigration on 
local labour markets.12 The literature investigating the views of natives 
towards further immigration is also growing rapidly. Whereas, views of 
immigrants towards immigration has gained little attention.  
This paper is a new addition to the sparse literature investigating how 
immigrants view further immigration, and how these views may vary between 
natives, earlier and more recent immigrants. The main finding of this research 
is that there is heterogeneity in the attitudes of immigrants towards 
immigration, with recent immigrants being less opposed to immigration than 
earlier immigrants.  
The results for earlier immigrants consistently lie between those of 
natives and recent immigrants. There are essentially two explanations why 
earlier immigrants are more similar to natives than recent ones. The first is 
that as time passes immigrants integrate into British society. Secondly, it 
could be the case that only those immigrants who are similar to natives stay 
in the country, while other immigrants, with differing views, leave. The first 
explanation is supported by the findings of Manning and Roy (2010) 
                                       
12 For reviews of the literature on the economic impact of immigration see Borjas. (1994), 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995), LaLonde and Topel (1996) and Borjas (1999). Contrary to Borjas 
(2003) most findings suggest that immigration does not have any considerable adverse effect 
on local labour markets, see Card (1990), Altonji and Card (1991), Kuhn and Wooton (1991), 
LaLonde and Topel (1991), Card (2001) for the US, Dustmann  et al. (2003), Dustmann et al. 
(2005) for the UK, Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1994), Pischke and Velling (1997), 
Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999) for Germany, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1996), 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999) for Austria, Hunt (1992) for France, Carrington and 
Lima (1996) for Portugal, and Angrist and Kugler (2003) for Western Europe as whole.  
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concerning cultural assimilation; immigrants appear to become more similar 
to natives the longer they have been in the country (see also, Gordon, 1964; 
Heath et al., 2013). Manning and Roy (2010) find that immigrants integrate 
into the British culture very easily. 
The second explanation is essentially self-selection but the limited 
available information in the data, in particular the fact that we do not observe 
immigrants who have left, does not allow this to be tested. It could also be the 
case that people who left the UK in fact did not want to leave the UK but they 
had to leave because of the visa restrictions.  
This study does not find any strong consistent evidence that the anti-
immigration views of natives, earlier and recent immigrants towards further 
immigration can be attributed to labour market outcomes. Even if the earlier 
immigrants and recent immigrants compete in the labour market, as 
suggested by the findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann et al. 
(2013), there is no strong evidence that the current employment status affects 
views towards further immigration. 
Results regarding the income of natives and earlier immigrants suggest 
a clear gradient for respondents, with higher income favouring further 
immigration, whereas there is some evidence for an inverted U-shape for 
recent immigrants. A potential explanation for this result is that low-income 
recent immigrants may have concerns that family reunification may be made 
harder by tougher immigration laws, and these worries may overwhelm other 
concerns.  
We further find evidence in all three groups that economic shocks, such 
as job loss or drops in income in a previous period matter, even when holding 
current employment status and the level of income constant. This finding is 
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in line with the previous literature (see, for example, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and 
Yun, 2013; and Malchow-Moller et al., 2008). This result suggests that people 
might be blaming immigrants for adverse shocks, regardless of whether they 
recover from the respective shock.  
Overall, this research suggests (a) that earlier immigrants and natives 
share more similar views towards further immigration than earlier and recent 
immigrants, (b) that employment status does not play a large role in explaining 
anti-immigration views, (c) income matters, even though the exact effects differ 
at low incomes between recent immigrants, natives and earlier immigrants, 
and (d) that economic shocks tend to be associated with more anti-
immigration views. 
These results are important in helping us understand some of the 
drivers behind anti-immigration views – which played a large role both in the 
2016 UK referendum on EU membership and the 2016 US presidential 
election. Importantly, the fact that both earlier and more recent immigrants 
also oppose further immigration, although to a lesser extent than natives, 
suggests that this opposition cannot simply be explained as xenophobia.  
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Table 1: Respondent categorisation based on ethnicity and nationality (2007 – 
2010) 
Sr. 
No. Categorisation (2007 – 2010) 
 
Total 
45152 
1 Respondent born in the UK with both parents born in the UK  23600 
 1.1 White (based on ethnicity) 22560 
23592 
1.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 1032 
1.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 20 
23600 1.4 Only British (based on national identity) 21691 
1.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 1889 
2 Respondent born in the UK with one parent born abroad  1959 
 2.1 White (based on ethnicity) 866 
1959 
2.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 1093 
2.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 32 
1959 2.4 Only British (based on national identity) 1754 
2.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 173 
3 Respondent born in the UK with both parents born abroad  4287 
 3.1 White (based on ethnicity) 298 
4286 
3.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 3988 
3.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 138 
4287 3.4 Only British (based on national identity) 3658 
3.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 491 
4 Respondent born abroad and both parents born in the UK  258 
 4.1 White (based on ethnicity) 244 
258 
4.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 14 
4.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 3 
258 4.4 Only British (based on national identity) 220 
4.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 35 
5 Respondent born abroad with one of the parents born abroad  275 
 5.1 White (based on ethnicity) 156 
275 
5.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 119 
5.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 14 
275 5.4 Only British (based on national identity) 204 
5.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 57 
6 Respondent born abroad with both parents born abroad  14469 
 6.1 White (based on ethnicity) 1192 
14465 
6.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 13273 
6.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 511 
14469 6.4 Only British (based on national identity) 7823 
6.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 6135 
     
Note: There are 304 missing values in country of birth identifiers due to unknown country of 
birth of the respondent, his mother or his father. 13 missing in ethnicity. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (2007 – 2010) 
Variables Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Reduce 
Migration 
0.823 0.382 0.530 0.499 0.334 0.472 
Increase 
Migration 
0.177 0.382 0.470 0.499 0.666 0.472 
Out of Labour 
Force 
0.313 0.464 0.323 0.468 0.218 0.413 
Self Employed 0.069 0.254 0.082 0.274 0.039 0.193 
Unemployed 0.150 0.357 0.162 0.368 0.181 0.385 
Employed 0.468 0.499 0.434 0.496 0.563 0.496 
Male 0.449 0.497 0.484 0.500 0.538 0.499 
Female 0.551 0.497 0.516 0.500 0.462 0.499 
Age 50.262 18.589 46.622 15.422 31.319 9.449 
Income below 5K 0.189 0.392 0.257 0.437 0.344 0.475 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.209 0.407 0.198 0.399 0.165 0.371 
Income 10K to 
15K 
0.156 0.363 0.158 0.365 0.163 0.369 
Income 15K to 
20K 
0.117 0.321 0.107 0.309 0.096 0.294 
Income 20K to 
30K 
0.158 0.365 0.149 0.356 0.125 0.331 
Income 30K to 
50K 
0.125 0.330 0.098 0.297 0.071 0.256 
Income above 
50K 
0.045 0.208 0.033 0.180 0.036 0.186 
White 0.956 0.204 0.078 0.268 0.112 0.315 
Subcontinent 0.016 0.126 0.456 0.498 0.388 0.488 
Other Asian 0.001 0.027 0.057 0.232 0.078 0.268 
Black 0.010 0.100 0.265 0.441 0.202 0.402 
Mixed Race 0.010 0.101 0.038 0.190 0.035 0.184 
Chinese 0.000 0.007 0.025 0.157 0.049 0.215 
Other Ethnicities 0.006 0.079 0.080 0.272 0.136 0.343 
Christian 0.776 0.417 0.341 0.474 0.368 0.482 
Budh 0.002 0.045 0.016 0.127 0.037 0.189 
Hindu 0.002 0.039 0.135 0.341 0.152 0.359 
Jewish 0.003 0.052 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.035 
Muslim 0.017 0.129 0.385 0.487 0.330 0.470 
Sikh 0.001 0.037 0.053 0.225 0.027 0.162 
Other Religion 0.019 0.138 0.026 0.159 0.021 0.144 
No Religion 0.180 0.384 0.040 0.197 0.063 0.243 
Practicing 
Religion 
0.271 0.444 0.739 0.439 0.715 0.451 
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Not Practicing 
Religion 
0.729 0.444 0.261 0.439 0.285 0.451 
       
Observations 20125 8399 2448 
Variables available only for 2009 – 2010 
 
Lost Job 0.059 0.236 0.055 0.228 0.088 0.284 
Drop in Income 0.259 0.438 0.240 0.427 0.187 0.390 
Cutbacks in 
Luxuries 
0.390 0.488 0.307 0.461 0.213 0.410 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 
0.332 0.471 0.334 0.472 0.228 0.420 
Non listed 0.420 0.494 0.457 0.498 0.565 0.496 
Observations 7068 3119 817 
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Table 3: Comparison of unconditional and conditional models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reduce 
Immigration 
Unconditional Models Conditional Models 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
   Coefficients    Coefficients 
Panel A: Base specification: Various estimation methods 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-.488*** 
(.010) 
-.414*** 
(.008) 
-1.353*** 
(.028) 
-1.28*** 
(.022) 
-.299*** 
(.015) 
-.243*** 
(.012) 
-.836*** 
(.041) 
-.761*** 
(.033) 
Earlier 
Immigrants  
-.292*** 
(.006) 
-.260*** 
(.005) 
-.850*** 
(0.017) 
-.816*** 
(.015) 
-.131*** 
(.012) 
-.120*** 
(.010) 
-.412*** 
(.035) 
-.392*** 
(.029) 
Constant .823*** 
(.003) 
 .925*** 
(.010) 
 .378*** 
(.015) 
 .663 
(.682) 
 
Sample Size 30972 30972 30972 30972 30972 30969 30969 30972 
R2/ Pseudo R2 .135  .108 .064 .181  .150 .090 
Panel B: Estimates without constant 
Natives .823*** 
(.003) 
   .378*** 
(.015) 
   
Recent 
Immigrants 
.334*** 
(.010) 
   .079*** 
(.021) 
   
Earlier 
Immigrants  
.530*** 
(.005) 
   .248*** 
(.018) 
   
Conditional models control for employment status, wave year, age dummies, ethnicity, religion, practising religion or not, 
income, and region. Omitted category for migrant status dummy is “natives”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table 4: Comparison of immigrant definitions 
 Narrow natives vs. 
narrow immigrants 
(Table 3) 
UK born vs. narrow 
immigrants 
UK born vs. UK born 
with immigration 
background vs. foreign 
born 
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-.488*** 
(.010) 
-.299*** 
(.015) 
-.452*** 
(0.010) 
-.290*** 
(0.012) 
-.488*** 
(0.010) 
-.308*** 
(.013) 
Earlier 
Immigrants  
-.292*** 
(.006) 
-.131*** 
(.012) 
-.256*** 
(0.006) 
-.123*** 
(0.008) 
-.285*** 
(0.006) 
-.138*** 
(0.010) 
Natives with 
immigration 
background 
    -.176*** 
(0.007) 
-.031*** 
(0.009) 
Sample Size 30972 30972 36205 36205 36652 36652 
Controls No Yes No Yes No  Yes 
 
Columns (1) and (2): Natives are individuals born in the UK to UK-born 
parents (base category). Immigrants are foreign-born individuals with foreign 
born parents. 
Columns (3) and (4): Natives are individuals born in the UK regardless of 
parents’ birth (base category). Immigrants are foreign-born individuals with 
foreign born parents. 
Columns (5) and (6): Natives are individuals born in the UK to UK-born 
parents (base category). Natives with immigration background are either 
individuals born in the UK with at least one parent born outside of the UK or 
overseas-born individuals whose parents were both born in the UK. 
Immigrants are all foreign-born individual, regardless of parents’ birth. 
Controls are identical to those used in Table 3. 
 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table 5: Coefficients of main controls for each respondent category (2007 – 
2010) 
Reduce 
Immigration 
OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-0.299*** 
(0.015) 
   
Earlier 
Immigrants 
-0.131*** 
(0.012) 
   
Female 0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.012) 
0.046** 
(0.021) 
Out of Labour 
Force 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.044*** 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
Self Employed 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.050) 
Unemployed 
 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
Income below 5K 
 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.100*** 
(0.032) 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.088** 
(0.034) 
Income 15K to 
20K 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.048 
(0.041) 
Income 20K to 
30K 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
-0.088** 
(0.037) 
Income 30K to 
50K 
-0.086*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.011) 
-0.066*** 
(0.022) 
-0.150*** 
(0.044) 
Income above 
50K 
-0.128*** 
(0.014) 
-0.142*** 
(0.017) 
-0.079** 
(0.034) 
-0.195*** 
(0.055) 
Subcontinent -0.018 
(0.017) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.039 
(0.043) 
Other Asian -0.073*** 
(0.023) 
0.139 
(0.127) 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.049) 
Black -0.158*** 
(0.015) 
-0.273*** 
(0.035) 
-0.098*** 
(0.022) 
-0.112*** 
(0.039) 
Mixed Race -0.087*** 
(0.021) 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
-0.009 
(0.060) 
Chinese -0.094*** 
(0.029) 
0.606*** 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.040) 
-0.071 
(0.057) 
Other Ethnicities -0.051*** 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.038) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
0.021 
(0.043) 
Budh -0.092*** 
(0.030) 
-0.053 
(0.067) 
-0.154*** 
(0.043) 
-0.002 
(0.057) 
Hindu -0.011 
(0.018) 
-0.258*** 
(0.097) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.054 
(0.038) 
Jewish -0.156*** 
(0.054) 
-0.138** 
(0.064) 
-0.210* 
(0.107) 
0.029 
(0.275) 
Muslim -0.109*** 
(0.014) 
-0.314*** 
(0.048) 
-0.075*** 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
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Sikh 0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.188* 
(0.100) 
0.010 
(0.029) 
0.104 
(0.067) 
Other Religion 0.000 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.034) 
0.086 
(0.073) 
No Religion -0.075*** 
(0.008) 
-0.081*** 
(0.008) 
-0.141*** 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.049) 
Practicing 
Religion 
-0.055*** 
(0.006) 
-0.050*** 
(0.006) 
-0.058*** 
(0.013) 
-0.023 
(0.025) 
Constant 
 
0.378*** 
(0.015) 
1.120*** 
(0.016) 
-0.088*** 
(0.033) 
0.086 
(0.068) 
Sample Size 30972 20125 8399 2448 
R2 0.181 0.065 0.075 0.059 
 
All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category 
for migrant status, employment status, income dummies, ethnicity, religion 
and practising religion is natives, employed and income10K to 15K, white, 
Christian, and not practising religion respectively. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Wave 2009 – 2010 models for each respondent category controlled for 
financial worry dummies 
Reduce 
Immigration 
OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-0.292*** 
(0.023) 
   
Earlier 
Immigrants 
-0.111*** 
(0.019) 
   
Lost Job 0.038** 
(0.017) 
0.045** 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.066) 
Drop in Income 0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.074 
(0.048) 
Cutbacks in 
Luxuries 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.070*** 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.046) 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
0.100** 
(0.045) 
Out of Labour 
Force 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
-0.113** 
(0.045) 
Self Employed -0.009 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.099 
(0.085) 
Unemployed -0.005 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
0.046 
(0.050) 
Female 0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
Income below 
5K 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.038 
(0.028) 
-0.111** 
(0.052) 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.067** 
(0.029) 
-0.080 
(0.058) 
Income 15K to 
20K 
0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
0.075** 
(0.035) 
-0.059 
(0.078) 
Income 20K to 
30K 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.032) 
-0.133** 
(0.066) 
Income 30K to 
50K 
-0.069*** 
(0.017) 
-0.087*** 
(0.019) 
-0.032 
(0.037) 
-0.070 
(0.076) 
Income above 
50K 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.112*** 
(0.028) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.155 
(0.107) 
Subcontinent -0.024 
(0.026) 
0.017 
(0.060) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.161** 
(0.078) 
Other Asian -0.108*** 
(0.036) 
0.122 
(0.139) 
-0.071 
(0.050) 
0.061 
(0.087) 
Black -0.189*** 
(0.023) 
-0.265*** 
(0.051) 
-0.123*** 
(0.038) 
-0.050 
(0.075) 
Mixed Race -0.052 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.051) 
-0.021 
(0.061) 
0.041 
(0.134) 
Chinese -0.128*** 
(0.048) 
 0.049 
(0.069) 
-0.112 
(0.087) 
Other 
Ethnicities 
-0.099*** 
(0.031) 
-0.102 
(0.089) 
-0.016 
(0.047) 
0.031 
(0.077) 
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Budh -0.039 
(0.054) 
0.023 
(0.102) 
-0.056 
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.094) 
Hindu 0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.190* 
(0.113) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
0.061 
(0.071) 
Jewish -0.206** 
(0.096) 
-0.124 
(0.112) 
-0.340* 
(0.187) 
-0.356*** 
(0.107) 
Muslim -0.109*** 
(0.021) 
-0.257*** 
(0.059) 
-0.077*** 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.052) 
Sikh -0.015 
(0.042) 
-0.138 
(0.115) 
-0.017 
(0.050) 
0.039 
(0.122) 
Other Religion 0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.039) 
0.030 
(0.064) 
0.220 
(0.149) 
No Religion -0.054*** 
(0.012) 
-0.058*** 
(0.013) 
-0.179*** 
(0.054) 
0.104 
(0.090) 
Practicing 
Religion 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.038 
(0.023) 
-0.052 
(0.044) 
Constant 
 
0.830*** 
(0.135) 
0.951*** 
(0.037) 
0.984*** 
(0.055) 
-0.152 
(0.106) 
Sample Size 11004 7068 3119 817 
R2 0.195 0.089 0.100 0.140 
 
All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category 
for financial worry dummies is “not reporting any worry”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table 7: Oaxaca decomposition of the determinants of attitudes towards 
immigration for natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants 
Reduce Immigration Natives / 
Earlier 
Immigrants 
Natives / 
Recent 
Immigrants  
Earlier 
Immigrants / 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Overall 
Group 1 
(Natives / Natives / Earlier) 
0.823*** 
(0.003) 
0.823*** 
(0.003) 
0.530*** 
(0.005) 
Group 2 
(Earlier / Recent / Recent) 
0.530*** 
(0.005) 
0.334*** 
(0.010) 
0.334*** 
(0.010) 
Difference 0.292*** 
(0.006) 
0.488*** 
(0.010) 
0.196*** 
(0.011) 
Endowments 0.112*** 
(0.018) 
0.033 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Coefficients 0.031 
(0.020) 
0.283*** 
(0.022) 
0.201*** 
(0.012) 
Interaction 0.150*** 
(0.026) 
0.172*** 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
 
All models control for: gender, employment status, ethnicity, religion, 
practising religion or not, income, wave year and region.  
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of the relationship between income and attitudes towards 
immigration for natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants 
 
 
 
Income below 5K is represented by 1, between 5K to 10K is represented by 2, 
3 is the ommited dummy, 4 represents income between 15K to 20K, 5 
represents income between 20K to 30K, 6 is for income between 30K to 50K 
and 7 is the income dummy for income above 50K. 
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